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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper analyzes the influence of ballot structure over satisfaction with democracy. In line 
with previous literature, we hypothesize that some ballot structures – such as preferential 
ballots – generate more satisfaction with democracy than closed ones. Yet, we expect these 
differences to be especially relevant among the more knowledgeable electorate, since any 
open ballot structure requires more sophisticated voters. Using CSES surveys, our results do 
not show a clear and parsimonious relation between ballot openness and satisfaction with 
democracy as some previous research seems to suggest. Our findings rather suggest that is 
preferential ballots and open lists the only ballot structures that generate more satisfaction 
than most of the remaining ballot structures. Yet, this relation is restricted only among the 
more knowledgeable electorate. The liberty of choice that ballot structure offers only concerns 
a reduced portion of the electorate, namely the more politically sophisticated one. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Why is satisfaction with democracy higher in some countries than in others? Many researchers have tried to find 
contextual or institutional arrangements to account for the different levels of satisfaction with democracy across 
countries. Most of the attention in this field has been focused on the particular design of the electoral systems. 
Since electoral systems are relatively malleable arrangements, many have found in this institution the solution to 
improve citizens’ satisfaction with democracy.  
 
This article assesses the influence of the electoral system on satisfaction with democracy. However, following an 
incipient body of literature, we study the effects generated not by the whole electoral system but by one of its 
components: the ballot structure. We do not defend the idea that the ballot structure is the philosopher’s stone 
which explains why some countries show a great satisfaction with their political system while others do not. We 
rather try to find out whether the ballot structure contributes in any measure –regardless its magnitude– to 
increase or reduce these levels of satisfaction with democracy. 
 
Previous research has suggested the superiority of open ballots for various reasons, such as they give voters 
greater choice or they encourage MPs to act as intermediaries between citizens and politics. Our paper shows 
that ballot structure has a modest but statistically significant impact on satisfaction with democracy, but not in 
the line suggested by the alluded previous research. Contrary to Farrell and McAllister (2006), our results do not 
support the idea that there is a clear and parsimonious relationship between ballot openness and satisfaction with 
democracy.  
 
In the following pages we aim to contribute to the existing literature in two ways. First, we posit what we 
consider to be a better statistical modelling as well as a better nominal operationalisation of the ballot structure. 
This nominal operationalisation –contrary to the ordinal one employed so far– helps us show that this effect is 
limited to some specific ballot structures and cannot be broadened –as previous research assumed– to the entire 
range. And secondly, we also want to show that the effect of ballot structure on satisfaction with democracy is 
restricted only to those voters with a higher level of political information. The beneficial effects of open ballots 
are mainly restricted to the more politically sophisticated electorate. Indeed, our results show that only the more 
knowledgeable voters seems to be concerned about the degree of choice that ballot structure offers the electorate.   
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2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
The political consequences of electoral systems is an old topic. Early studies such as Duverger (1954) and Rae 
(1967) studied the influence of the electoral system on the party system – a research structure that remained 
unchanged until Lijphart and Grofman (1984) and Taagepera and Shugart (1989). Lijphart (1994) varies the 
dependent variable: he claimed that proportional electoral systems engendered more satisfaction with democracy 
whereas Norris (1999) countered that majority systems would increase “accountability” and, thus, satisfaction 
with democracy.1 Later, Farrell and McAllister (2006) also vary the independent variable: they substitute the 
electoral system as a whole for its specific “ballot structure”. 
 
But, what do we mean by “ballot structure”? And also, what categories can this possibly take? Ballot structure is 
just one of the five elements that constitute an electoral system (electoral formula, district magnitude, ballot 
structure, legal threshold and apportionment) so it is not to be confused with the electoral system as a whole. It 
refers to the physical operation that the voter has to do in order to exercise suffrage: crossing the name of a 
candidate, choosing a list, ordering several names, and so on. This is why Farrell (2001: 6) refers to ballot 
structure with the simplified expression of “how voters cast their votes”. There have been several typologies 
which enumerate the possible categories of ballot structure. Rae (1967) differentiated ordinal and categorical 
ballots and Farrell (2001: 170) differentiated candidate-based ballots and party-based ones (see also interesting 
categorizations of ballot structure in Blais, 1988; Shugart, 2001; Bowler et al., 2005; Colomer, 2011: 9-11). 
Crossing these two dichotomies, several possible ballot structures have been envisaged (cf. Farrell, 2001: 170). 
The most common in the literature are the six following: 
 
Personalized ballot, where the voter chooses the actual name/s of the candidate/s and there are no party lists. 
This ballot structure is used in electoral systems such as the first-past-the-post system (US, UK, Canada, India), 
or the two-round system (France), or the limited vote system (Gibraltar), or even the single-non-transferable-vote 
system (Japan previous to 1993). 
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Preferential ballot, where the voter rank-orders the individual candidates put forward by all parties. This ballot 
structure is used in electoral systems such as the alternative vote system (Australia) or the single-transferable-
vote system (Ireland), and is not to be confused with ‘preference ballot’ –a name sometimes given to open lists. 
 
Closed list, where the voter simply accepts a complete list of candidates put forward by a party, without altering 
it in any way. This ballot structure is used in some list PR systems (such as in Spain) but it may be used also in 
other electoral systems such as the party-block vote system. 
 
Ordered list, where the voter chooses a list of candidates, but she may express special preference for one or 
several of the candidates, hence altering the order of the list. This is sometimes called ‘weak’ preference ballot 
(Karvonen 2004: 207). This ballot structure is used in some list PR systems (such as in Belgium). 
 
Open list, where the voter may select only a candidate name and not necessarily an entire party list, but this vote 
for the candidate is also counted as a vote for the party list to which that candidate belongs. This is sometimes 
called ‘strong’ preference ballot. This ballot structure is used in some list PR systems (such as in Denmark or 
Finland), but also in other PR systems where actual lists hardly exist (such as in Swiss panachage). 
 
And finally, a combination of two previous ballot structures: a personalized ballot together with a closed list, 
which we might call “personalized plus closed list”. This ballot structure is used in electoral systems such as the 
parallel system (Russia, Japan), and the mixed member proportional system (Germany, New Zealand). 
 
It seems plausible that ballot structure affects citizens’ satisfaction with democracy because the ballot structure is 
the only element of the electoral system which the citizen experiences directly. In fact, it is quite surprising that 
ballot structure did not appear as an antecedent of citizens’ satisfaction with democracy until the appearance of 
Farrell and McAllister’s article. This groundbreaking article details three mechanisms by which ballot structure 
may influence citizens’ satisfaction with democracy2. 
 
The “political efficacy mechanism” claims that some ballot structures offer voters a greater freedom to choose. 
These ballot structures may lead to a perception on the part of citizens that they have more say in the results of 
the election. Or put in other words, ballot structure has an effect on political efficacy. Therefore, Farrell and 
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McAllister (2006: 725) argue that ballot structure influences political efficacy which, in turn, influences 
satisfaction with democracy.3 The authors’ position is that preferential ballots and open lists are the ballot 
structures that offer greater freedom to choose, followed by personalised ballots (either alone or combined with 
closed lists), then ordered lists, and finally closed lists (2006: 731). Pereira and Andrade (2009) also treat the 
question of how different ballot structures give more or less ‘freedom of choice’. Following a more axiomatic 
rational choice approach, the authors rank the ballot structures according to (a) the available set of candidates or 
parties to choose from, and (b) the number of relevant candidates chosen by the voter in her ballot.4 According to 
these two dimensions, preferential ballots (named here ‘rank ballot’) and open lists remain at the top, but now 
followed by ordered lists (named here ‘preference ballot’). The personalised ballot (without primaries) now joins 
the closed lists at the bottom of the ranking. Although not being their object of study, Pereira and Andrade guess 
their ‘freedom of choice’ index should maintain some relationship to voter satisfaction. However, they explicitly 
warn that “it does not follow that greater citizens’ freedom of choice is always beneficial” (2009: 109).  
 
The “intermediary role mechanism” argues that some ballot structures might encourage MPs to act as 
intermediaries between citizens and politics. As re-election depends on their personal performance, MPs would 
develop closer links with citizens (Lawson, 1980; Mitchell, 2000; Römmele et al., 2005) and would pay attention 
to personal relations –even if only as a means to personal vote chasing. Some authors have articulated this idea 
through the concept of “reputation” (Curtice & Shively, 2009: 173), whereas others preferred the looser 
“representative role” of MPs (Farrell & McAllister, 2006: 725-727; Ames, 1995). Carey and Shugart (1995: 418-
419) even use both concepts. Authors disagree, though, on what are those “fruitful” ballot structures. According 
to Curtice and Shively (2009: 172-174) those would be personalized ballots (“single member plurality” in their 
terminology) because it is the only ballot structure with which a representative’s re-election depends on her 
personal performance. However, Margetts (2011: 41-46) disputes that personalized ballots have played this role 
in Britain. In addition, Carey and Shugart (1995: 418-9) and Farrell and McAllister (2006: 727) argue that 
personalized ballots are clearly poorer than open lists and preferential ballots. On their part, closed lists are often 
depicted as the worst ballots –though not always. In fact, some authors (see Curtice & Shively, 2009: 176) claim 
that closed lists may promote the intermediary role of MPs, since parties will be interested in including on their 
lists those candidates who have a reputation for performing this role. 
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The “accommodative politics mechanism” maintains that some ballot structures “encourage a politics of 
accommodation”. Preferential voting would be one of those because –there– every candidate is interested in 
being acceptable to rival voters in order to collect their second preferences (Farrell & McAllister, 2006: 726) and 
because party competition focuses on valence –rather than position– issues (Marsh, 2011: 149). This, in turn, 
promotes moderation, stability and –eventually– satisfaction with democracy. This mainstream position does not 
go unchallenged. Lijphart (1999) stresses that closed lists could perform this role since lists play an essential role 
in consensual democracies, which require MPs to stick to coalition deals and thus have no personal interest in 
defecting. And it could even be argued that preferential ballots and open lists stimulate intraparty competition 
and encourage independent positions, which do not promote precisely moderation and stability. 
 
The three mechanisms described show that theoretical agreement on which ballot structures generate a higher 
satisfaction with democracy is far from conclusive. However, they offer some hints as to what level of 
satisfaction with democracy we can expect from each ballot structure: 
 
Preferential ballots and open lists. There is ample agreement that these are the two ballot structures that offer 
more freedom to choose. We have also pointed out some disputes as to whether they are the two ballot structures 
that most encourage the intermediary role of MPs, but every part of the dispute places them high on the list. And 
finally, preferential ballots are supposed to be the ballot structure that most stimulate accommodative politics (in 
fact, they often constitute the ideal example) and open lists follow closely. Thus, we should expect these two 
ballot structures to generate the highest levels of satisfaction with democracy. In addition, we have identified no 
solid motives to expect great differences between them.  
 
Ordered lists. This ballot structure offers an intermediate level of freedom to choose. Maybe Pereira and 
Andrade (2009) assess it somewhat more sympathetically than Farrell and McAllister (2006), but differences are 
not great. In addition, this ballot structure is only relatively prone to encouraging the intermediary role of MPs 
and not particularly prone to stimulating accommodative politics. Thus, we should expect this ballot structure to 
generate a rather low level of satisfaction with democracy.  
 
Closed lists. Our review of the literature depicted closed lists as giving less freedom to choose, not encouraging 
the intermediary role of MPs and not stimulating accommodative politics. Thus, we should expect closed lists to 
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generate the lowest level of satisfaction with democracy. However, we already pointed out that some authors 
(e.g. Curtice & Shively, 2009, as well as Lijphart, 1999) diverged from this negative vision. This specific 
disagreement on the role of closed lists should be kept in mind when discussing the results.5 
 
Personalised ballots (and personalized plus closed lists). The conventional image of personalized ballots suggests 
a relatively high freedom to choose, considerable reinforcement of the intermediary role of MPs and not much 
incentive for accommodative politics. Thus, we should expect this ballot structure to generate a relatively high 
level of satisfaction with democracy. However, our review of the literature also identified some discrepancies 
with these questions: Pereira and Andrade (2009) questioned its freedom of choice and Margetts (2011) 
questioned its reinforcement of the intermediary role of MPs. Again, these discrepancies should be kept in mind 
when discussing the results. A different question is how personalized ballots relate to the sixth one (personalized 
plus closed lists). It could be argued that the relevant features (both the freedom to choose and the reinforcement 
of the intermediary role of MPs) of this sixth ballot structure come from its personalized side. Thus, we should 
expect this ballot structure (personalized plus closed lists) to generate a level of satisfaction with democracy 
similar to the personalized ballot. Or at least, we have identified no motives to expect great differences between 
them.  
 
3. HYPOTHESES 
 
The theoretical antecedents reported in the previous section led us to build four specific hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 1. We hypothesize that countries using open lists or preferential ballots should display a higher level 
of satisfaction with democracy than countries using closed lists. This hypothesis is built upon the three 
mechanisms detailed in the previous section. First, closed lists clearly offer less choice than open lists and 
preferential ballots, which should imply less political efficacy and less satisfaction with democracy6. Second, 
they could prevent the intermediary role of MPs, with the same consequences for satisfaction with democracy. 
And third, they would not stimulate accommodative politics as open lists and preferential ballots do, and so less 
satisfaction with democracy would be expected.  
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Hypothesis 2. We hypothesize that countries using open lists or preferential ballots should display a higher level 
of satisfaction with democracy than countries using personalized ballots. The theoretical foundation of this 
hypothesis based on the three alluded mechanisms goes as follows. First, personalized ballots offer clearly less 
choice than open lists and preferential ballots. This should imply less political efficacy and less satisfaction with 
democracy. Second, they do not encourage the intermediary role of MPs as much as open lists and preferential 
ballots do. This should reduce the level of satisfaction with democracy. And third, they do not stimulate 
accommodative politics, and so they restrict satisfaction with democracy.  
 
Hypothesis 3. We hypothesize that countries using personalized ballots should display a higher level of 
satisfaction with democracy than countries using closed lists. The theoretical foundation of this hypothesis based 
on the alluded mechanisms is the following. First, personalized ballots offer more choice than closed lists. This 
should imply more political efficacy and more satisfaction with democracy. Second, personalized ballots should 
encourage the intermediary role of MPs more than closed lists. This should increase the level of satisfaction with 
democracy. 
 
Hypothesis 4. We hypothesize that countries using ordered lists should display an intermediate level of 
satisfaction with democracy, falling between countries using open lists and countries using closed lists. The 
literature reviewed in Section 2 typically describes ordered lists only as an intermediate category between open 
lists and closed lists. This implies that the only hypothesis we can infer about satisfaction with democracy 
engendered by ordered lists is the one above. 
 
As we explain in the next section, we treat ballot structure as a categorical variable in order to avoid making 
assumptions about the linearity of the relation. Although our hypotheses have some expectations about the rank 
position of the different ballot structures, we do not assume that each unit change has the same effect on 
satisfaction with democracy. In other words, we do not believe there are uniform differences between each ballot 
structure: for instance, we expect open lists and preferential ballots to be significantly superior to the remaining 
categories, but we do not have clear expectations about the differences between ordered list and personalized 
vote. 
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The above four hypotheses assumed that the effects of ballot structure on satisfaction with democracy are 
uniform for all citizens. The academic literature has not yet hypothesized that these effects should be higher or 
lower among certain socio-demographic or attitudinal groups. However, we posit that political knowledge is a 
key intervening variable. Knowledge is an important ingredient for casting an informed vote; when voters know 
the rules of the game they can have a more precise idea about the implications of one’s vote.  Without political 
knowledge voters are less prepared to choose the party or candidate that best represents their political 
preferences. As Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996 suggest: “in the absence of adequate information neither passion 
nor reason is likely to lead to decisions that reflect the real interests of the public.” Yet, some ballot structures 
require higher levels of knowledge and skill than others. As such, it would seem sensible to assume that the 
“political efficacy” and the “intermediary role” mechanisms are going to be especially valued by politically 
sophisticated voters, whereas for non-politically sophisticated ones the complexity of the ballots may be more of 
a nuisance than an asset. Thus, we came up with a fifth hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 5. We hypothesize that the effects of ballot structure on satisfaction with democracy will be restricted 
to those voters with a higher level of political information.  
 
4. DATA AND METHODS 
 
In order to test our hypotheses, we use the three waves of the CSES project that cover 106 elections around the 
world from 1996 to 2011. However, due to the availability of information on the dependent and independent 
variables used in our study, the sample is reduced to 85 elections.7 The survey includes many of the necessary 
individual-level variables to test our hypotheses.  
 
Dependent variable.  Our dependent variable is a 4 point scale that measures satisfaction with democracy. The 
survey item is the following: “On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all 
satisfied with the way democracy works in [country]?” Some authors have questioned the validity of the measure 
because it rather captures evaluations of system outputs (i.e. Cannache et al., 2001; but see Fuchs, 1993). That 
said, it is the best indicator available in comparative political surveys and has been the standard dependent 
variable in previous similar research.  
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Independent variables. Our main independent variable is ballot structure. Previous studies such as Farrell and 
McAllister (2006) have measured the effect of ballot structure openness by creating an ordinal index based on 
Carey and Shugart’s work (1995). Their index takes the lowest value in closed lists and higher values in 
personalized ballots, open lists and, at the top, preferential ballots. Other similar indexes have been developed 
(see Pereira & Andrade, 2009). Farrell and McAllister’s strategy is based on the rather strong assumption of 
linearity in the relation between ballot structure and satisfaction with democracy.8 Yet, ballot structure has a 
categorical nature with no clear natural ordering and with an unknown distance between the categories. Due to 
these reservations, in this article we do not treat ballot structure as a continuous variable. By using a categorical 
measure, we avoid making a priori assumptions about the ordering of the categories and the linearity of the 
relation (see also Curtice & Shively, 2009). Note that –even if the categorical indicator of ballot structure 
contains six categories– our statistical analysis uses just four values: since in the previous section we 
hypothesized that preferential ballots would behave in a rather similar way to open lists, we collapsed these two 
categories; likewise, since in the previous section we hypothesized that personalized ballots would behave in a 
rather similar way to personalized ballots plus closed lists, we also collapsed these two categories. Moreover, 
using fewer categories also allows us to avoid having a small number of observations at the contextual level.9 
 
The main individual-level independent variable (which will act as an interactive variable) is political 
information. We need this variable to study the fifth hypothesis about the interactive effect between political 
sophistication and ballot structure. Although the literature has provided different ways of measuring political 
sophistication, factual knowledge is for many researchers the best alternative among the available proxies in 
most surveys (Zaller 1992, Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). Other measures such as subjective assessments of 
respondents’ political interest or level of education are problematic: the former is affected by social desirability 
bias and the latter is only a determinant of political knowledge, which, even in some instances, is only 
moderately correlated with political sophistication (Luskin 1990, Zaller 1992).  
 
Following previous research, we built an index using the three items of factual political knowledge.10 The CSES 
survey includes three different questions regarding factual knowledge of issues related to domestic and foreign 
politics which vary across countries. These items are dichotomous and take value 1 when the answer is correct 
and 0 otherwise. We have created an index with these variables which scores 1 when respondents had no correct 
answer and scores 4 when all answers were correct. 
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Unfortunately, the CSES political knowledge items are far from perfect. In particular, some researchers have 
raised some reservations about the comparability of the items across countries. The CSES instructed research 
teams of different countries to formulate the three items in ascending difficulty: questions must be formulated in 
a way that they produce about 1/3, 1/2 and 2/3 correct answers respectively (Grönlund and Milner 2006). The 
aim was to homogenize item difficulty across countries and, therefore, enhance comparability. However, 
political information questions are not standardized and vary across countries, which certainly reduces the 
possibility of cross-country comparisons. Despite its imperfections, there are no better alternatives to CSES data. 
The European Election Study (EES) solves the CSES problem by asking the exact same questions in all 
countries. Unfortunately, using EES data would reduce the number of countries included in our study and, more 
importantly, the variability of our main independent variable. 
 
Individual-level control variables. We included the standard socio-demographic control variables: age (and age 
squared to account for nonlinear effects), gender (leaving male as the base category), education (as originally 
coded), household income (by quintiles), and labour situation (unemployed vs. other situation). These are the 
socio-demographic control variables that have generally been considered in the literature on this topic, but we 
shall show that not all studies find that socio-demographic variables have significant effects on satisfaction with 
democracy (i.e. Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Listhaug et al., 2009). We also include a variable that measures 
whether individuals voted for the party that won the elections. It is a well-settled conclusion in the literature that 
satisfaction with democracy is partly affected by electoral outcomes: individuals tend to be more satisfied with 
the way democracy works when it produces the electoral outcomes that they prefer (Anderson & Guillory, 1997; 
Nadeau & Blais, 1993; Blais & Gélineau, 2007; Singh, Lago & Blais, 2011). Our control variable takes value 1 
when the individual voted for the winning party and value 0 otherwise.  
 
System-specific control variables. First, we include two economic related variables: GDP per capita (in $ at PPP) 
and GDP growth in the year previous to the election, using IMF data. These are standard control variables in the 
literature on satisfaction with democracy, which have consistently found that both the economic level as well as 
the economic situation are two important factors (see Norris, 1999; Listhaug et al., 2009; Curtice & Shively, 
2009). The inclusion of GDP is particularly important for our purposes since it is correlated with ballot structure. 
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The danger is that the potential differences found between these types of ballots may turn out to be spurious if 
we do not take the economic factors into account.  
 
The second system-specific control variable is proportionality. There has been prolific debate in the literature 
about whether proportionality goes together with higher evaluations of democracy. Some authors find evidence 
in that line (i.e. Lijphart, 1999) others do not (i.e. Aarts & Thomassen, 2008; Norris, 1999). Thus, the importance 
of proportionality is still an open question that requires more research. We use the Gallagher index of 
disproportionality.11 Ballot structure is correlated with proportionality (i.e. personalized ballots are more present 
in less proportional systems), and thus we need to control for this in order to avoid potential spurious relations.12 
 
Finally, we also include some other system-specific control variables that the literature has considered as 
important factors in accounting for support for democracy: the age of the democratic system (i.e. Aarts & 
Thomassen, 2008), the size of the legislative assembly and the number of adult citizens per MP (i.e. Farrell & 
McAllister, 2006; Curtice & Shively, 2009). 
 
Statistical methods. Since we combine individual and national level variables, we use the multilevel regression 
technique. Thus, the estimates reported in the empirical part are based on multilevel linear regression models 
(with random slope). With this procedure we try to avoid some of the methodological problems of Farrell and 
McAllister’s (2006) work, the major previous research on this issue. These authors do not take into consideration 
the multilevel structure of their data and their results are based in OLS linear regression estimations.13 However, 
ignoring the contextual layer of the data leads to the violation of the assumption that observations are 
independent, and this produces lower estimated standard errors, thus increasing the probability of Type I errors 
(see Steenbergen & Jones, 2002). Indeed, the estimates of OLS in these types of data produce unbiased 
coefficients but smaller sample variance, which generates spurious significance tests.   
 
5. RESULTS 
 
Since we believe that Farrell and McAllister’s work is so far the major contribution in this field, the first step of 
the empirical section is to replicate their models and study whether their conclusions still hold once we include 
the three waves of the CSES project and take into consideration the concerns just expressed in the 
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methodological section. Farrell and McAllister found that ballot structure (as measured by their continuous intra-
party index) had an influence on individuals’ satisfaction with democracy. Yet, the magnitude of this effect was 
substantially reduced once the authors included the control variables, in particular GDP. With no control 
variables (or with only the individual-level variables) the coefficient was about 0.16, but it dropped to 0.04 once 
relevant country-level characteristics were included such as GDP and years of democratic experience (2006: 
736). This meant that most of the initial effect of the ballot structure was really capturing some country 
differences. Despite this, the ballot structure indicator remained statistically significant at p<0.01. 
 
In Table 1 we estimate the results by using two different statistical techniques: we first use the OLS linear 
regression, like Farrell and McAllister (2006) did in their article, and we then use the multilevel regression 
technique, which allows us to fit random effects and account for the hierarchal structure of the data. The models 
also include some extra control variables that we consider important (i.e. age squared and GDP growth, voting 
for the winning party, and political information), but their inclusion does not substantially change our 
conclusions.  
 
<Table 1 about here> 
 
The first model of the table (Model 1) shows our replication of the Farrell and McAllister model (using OLS 
estimations) for the three waves of the CSES. The results are very similar to those reported by them. The 
coefficient associated with their continuous ballot structure indicator is smaller in our models (it passes from 
0.04 to 0.025), but it still keeps its statistical significance at the p<0.01.  Most control variables behave fairly 
similar to the Farrell and McAllister model. Although the coefficients vary, some variables such as GDP, 
democratic experience or disproportionality show the same expected sign and are significant at p<0.01.  Yet 
there are some differences: for instance, contrary to Farrell and McAllister’s work, assembly size has a negative 
and significant effect; and voting age population per MP has a positive and significant effect on satisfaction with 
democracy. However, the coefficients are rather small. 
 
That said, the overall results of our replication are fairly similar to those provided by Farrell and McAllister. In 
this sense, the effect of their ballot structure indicator is robust and does not vary once we incorporate the second 
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and third waves of the CSES. With OLS estimations we find that ballot openness generates higher satisfaction 
with democracy.  
 
Yet, we already mentioned that using OLS in data with a multilayered structure tends to lead to significance tests 
with inflated type I errors (i.e. false rejection of the null hypothesis). As such, we need to replicate the models 
using the multilevel regression technique. Model 2 shows the effect of the Farrell and McAllister intraparty 
indicator with no control variables, and this effect turns out to be significant at p<0.01. The inclusion of 
individual-level control variables (Model 3) does not seem to alter the results, but the country-level control 
variables (Model 4) halve the coefficient and reduce its level of significance to p<0.05.  
 
The results denote that the Farrell and McAllister indicator still plays a role when we use the appropriate 
statistical technique and increase the number of elections under analysis, but there are some differences worth 
mentioning. First, the magnitude of the coefficient is now somewhat smaller: Farrell and McAllister reported a 
final coefficient of 0.04 in their full model, whereas now it is 0.02. Secondly, and more importantly, the level of 
significance is now weaker: Farrell and McAllister reported a final level of significance of p<0.01 in their full 
model, whereas now it is p<0.05. Overall, the effect of their intraparty indicator now seems to be weaker than 
what Farrell and McAllister found.  
 
The next step of our analysis is to abandon the assumption of a linear relationship posited by Farrell and 
McAllister and treat ballot structure as a categorical variable. The models of Table 2 precisely try to disentangle 
the effect of ballot structure on satisfaction with democracy using our categorical variable of ballot structure. In 
Model 5 we estimate the effect with no control variables. The results are partly compatible with our expectations. 
Preferential ballots and open lists, which are the base category in our models, are associated with higher 
satisfaction with democracy compared to all remaining ballot structures. The differences are statistically 
significant at the p<0.01 level. Although not displayed in Table 2, Model 5 also indicates that ordered lists 
generate more satisfaction with democracy than closed lists (p<0.05) and that all remaining pairwise 
comparisons are not statistically significant. Therefore, the estimates seem to refute our third hypothesis: despite 
the fact that some argue that personalized ballots offer more choice and encourage the intermediary role of MPs 
more than closed lists, countries using the former do not display a significantly higher level of satisfaction with 
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democracy than countries using the latter. On the other hand, the estimates corroborate our first, second and 
fourth hypotheses.   
 
<Table 2 about here> 
 
These results do not substantially change once we include the individual-level control variables. The conclusions 
of Model 6 are fairly similar to the previous model: preferential and open lists are associated with higher 
satisfaction with democracy compared with the remaining categories. Yet, the inclusion of the country-level 
variables reduces the effects of ballot structure (Model 7). The coefficients associated with personalized ballots 
and with ordered lists become smaller, although the differences are still significant. But more importantly, this 
new model fails to find relevant differences between preferential ballots and open lists on the one hand, and 
closed lists on the other. Even if these were the two opposite extremes of Farrell and McAllister’s scale, our 
estimates suggest that they both generate the same level of satisfaction with democracy. This does not seem to 
confirm the expectations of the literature: that there is no clear linear relation between the openness of the ballot 
structure and satisfaction with democracy. Preferential ballots and open lists generate more satisfaction only 
compared to personalized ballots and to ordered lists but there are no differences at all compared to closed lists. 
Figure 1 shows that the remaining pairwise comparisons do not generate significant differences.  
 
<Figure 1 about here> 
 
 
In sum, we have not found evidence to support our first and third hypotheses: closed lists do not generate less 
satisfaction than preferential ballots and open lists, or than personalized ballots. The great differences between 
ballot structures found in Model 5 turned out to be solely due to the effect of other country characteristics –
specifically, GDP and democratic experience. Still, we have found evidence to support our second hypothesis –
and to some extent, our fourth– even after including the individual- and country-level control variables. Our 
results clearly indicate that there is a non-linear effect between satisfaction with democracy and the openness of 
the ballot structure. It is not true that ballots that incorporate more open features generate more satisfaction with 
democracy. Instead, the two extremes generate the same level of satisfaction.  
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So far, not all our hypotheses have been confirmed and the data rather show a counterintuitive picture. Yet, we 
still need to test our fifth hypothesis about the importance of political sophistication. We claim that some of the 
arguments posited in the literature to explain the superiority of preferential voting is that they offer voters greater 
choice when voting. However, it is plausible that this freedom will be particularly important for the satisfaction 
of those with greater political information, who are more likely to have knowledge about the different individual 
candidates on the party lists.  
 
We test this fifth hypothesis in our last model of Table 2 (Model 8). The results are quite compatible with our 
expectations. Indeed, the three interaction terms between ballot structure and political information are negative 
and statistically significant. This means that preferential ballots and open lists generate more satisfaction vis-à-
vis all other categories as voters’ political information increases. In fact, ballot structure seems to be irrelevant 
among the less informed electorate. Its effect on satisfaction with democracy only emerges among those with 
greater political information.14  
 
Figure 2 shows the predicted values of satisfaction with democracy for different levels of political information 
(using Model 8 estimates). Among individuals with low levels of information, open ballots do not generate more 
satisfaction than the remaining ballot structures. Yet, open ballot becomes the category that generates more 
satisfaction with democracy once we focus on those with high levels of information. In sum, the figure shows 
that differences between the four types of ballot structure are conditioned by individuals’ levels of political 
information. 
 
<Figure 2 about here> 
 
Concerns about how much degree of choice the system should offer the electorate to decide on the actual names 
of their candidates is restricted to the politically aware electorate. Besides, the coefficient of closed lists, 
although non-significant, is positive, which points to the opposite direction of the conventional hypothesis. At 
the end of the day, it might even be plausible that the uninformed electorate prefer easier decisions such as 
choosing political parties (and not candidates) and delegating to them the responsibility of choosing the most 
competent candidates.  
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Despite not being the main objective of this article, our regression models test some tangential hypotheses 
posited in the literature. First, our results are fully compatible with the widespread idea that individuals who vote 
for the winning party tend to be more satisfied with democracy. Also, like previous studies on this topic our 
results show that GDP (both the level and the growth during the previous year) and years of democratic 
experience also have a significant positive effect. The level of proportionality generated by the electoral system 
has no relevant impact. Hence, our results are in the line with those reported by other previous research such as 
Aarts and Thomassen (2008) or Norris (1999) and opposed to Lijphart (1999). Finally, neither the size of the 
legislative assembly nor the number of citizens per representative follow the expectations in the literature 
(Farrell & McAllister, 2006), since neither seems to be relevant in explaining the level of satisfaction with 
democracy.  
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper has studied the influence of ballot structure on how citizens assess democracy. Previous research has 
suggested that ballots that give voters more freedom of choice tend to increase satisfaction with how democracy 
works. Our results suggest that ballot structure does indeed have an impact, but not in the line suggested by 
previous research. Contrary to Farrell and McAllister (2006), we do not find a clear linear relation between the 
level of ballot openness and satisfaction with democracy. Yet, our results do not indicate that ballot structure is 
irrelevant. In fact, we find that it produces three different effects.  
 
First, preferential ballots and open lists do generate more satisfaction than both personalized ballots and also 
ordered lists. This seems to support the standard perspective about the desirability of more open ballots because 
it gives voters greater choice and promotes the intermediate role of candidates and accommodative politics. But, 
contrary to this perspective, we do not find relevant differences between the two extremes of ballot openness: 
preferential ballots and open lists on the one hand, and closed lists on the other. Our evidence points to a 
different direction than that found in Farrell and McAllister (2006). Overall, we do not find a clear and 
parsimonious relationship between ballot openness and satisfaction with democracy as some previous research 
seems to suggest. Our findings rather suggest that such a relationship is non-linear.  
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Secondly, ballot structure is only a relevant factor among the more politically sophisticated electorate. Indeed, 
only those with greater levels of political information seem to be concerned about the ballot structure they use 
when voting. Our findings also indicate that the more knowledgeable the voter is, the greater the satisfaction 
preferential ballots generate vis-à-vis most remaining ballots. The liberty of choice that ballot structure offers 
only concerns a reduced portion of the electorate, namely the more politically sophisticated. 
 
The conclusions of previous studies may encourage the temptation to increase the legitimacy of democratic 
regimes through establishing more open ballot structures. Our results do not support this perspective. Clearly, 
some types of ballot structure promote more satisfaction with democracy than others, but this concern is only 
restricted to a small portion of the total population: the most politically sophisticated citizens. Ironically enough, 
this is the electorate that already shows higher levels of satisfaction. 
 
 
 
                                                          
1. See also Rose (1992) and Castles (1994). Lijphart (1999) Anderson & Guillory (1997) and Brockington 
(2003) are on the proportional side; while Aarts & Thomassen (2008) Castles (1994) and Listhaug et al. (2009) 
are on the majoritarian. 
2. This list only refers to mechanisms linking ballot structure with satisfaction with democracy. The 
consequences of other elements of the electoral system, as well as other antecedents of satisfaction with 
democracy, are deliberately ignored here. 
3. Notice such a process is observable even in turnout data: Carey and Enten (2011: 90-95) shows how some 
openness in the ballots (such as primaries) increases turnout. 
4. Two caveats should be noted. First, they also compute a third element (the information the voter receives 
about the chosen candidate), but we shall not take this into account since the authors do not derive this 
information from the ballot structure –which is our subject. Second, they do not exactly rank the ballot 
structures, but country specific electoral systems. 
5. Incidentally, these sorts of disagreements would not be addressable with the traditional ordinal 
operationalization of ballot structure. 
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6. This sentence clearly suggests an additional hypothesis (let’s call it ‘hypothesis 1b’) where ‘political efficacy’ 
would act as an intervening variable. Unluckily, CSES does not have a question on political efficacy, so 
hypothesis 1b would not be testable with the data we have to use. 
7. The elections included are the following: Albania (2005), Australia (1996, 2004, 2007), Austria (2008), 
Belgium (1999), Brazil (2002), Canada (1997, 2004), Switzerland (1999, 2003, 2007), Chile (2005), Czech 
Republic (1996, 2002, 2006), Germany (1998, 2002, 2005, 2009), Spain (1996,2000, 2004), Finland (2003, 
2007), France (2002, 2007), UK (1997, 2005), Hong Kong (1998, 2000, 2004, 2008), Croatia (2007), Hungary 
(1998, 2002), Ireland (2002, 2007), Iceland (2007, 2009), Israel (1996, 2003, 2006), Italy (2006), Japan (1996, 
2004, 2007), Korea (2004, 2008), Mexico (1997, 2000, 2003, 2006, 2009), Netherlands (1998, 2002, 2006), 
Norway (1997, 2001, 2005), New Zealand (1996, 2002, 2008), Peru (2006), Poland (1997, 2001, 2005, 2007), 
Portugal (2002, 2005, 2009), Romania (1996, 2004), Russia (2004), Slovenia (2004), Sweden (1998, 2002, 
2006), Thailand (2007), Taiwan (1996, 2001, 2004), Ukraine (1998), USA (1996, 2004). Most dropped cases are 
due to the political knowledge variable, which is essential to test one of our hypotheses. Yet, when not 
necessary, the exclusion of this variable (and thus the substantial increase of countries and elections in our 
sample) does not substantially change the conclusions reached in this article. 
8. However, note that in the original article which set up the topic, Shugart (2001: 176) did not have a linear 
relationship in mind. Quite the contrary, he termed the two extremes of the intraparty continuum as 
‘hyperpersonalistic’ and ‘hypercentralised’, thus illustrating that he presumed both extremes would eventually 
generate negative effects.  
9. We have classified the countries into the four ballot structures as follows: Open lists and preferential ballots 
(Finland, Switzerland, Australia, Ireland), ordered list (Brazil, Belgium, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, 
Czech Republic), personalised ballot and personalised ballot plus closed list (New Zealand, UK, Taiwan, 
Germany, Japan, Canada, USA, Hungary, South Korea, Ukraine, France, Hong Kong), closed list (Portugal, 
Mexico, Spain, Israel, Rumania). 
10. Some examples of previous comparative studies using CSES three-items political knowledge are: Birch 
2010, Singh and Thornton 2012, Tóka 2009. 
11. Formally, the Gallagher index (often called Least squared index) is: ( )211/ 2 n i iiLsq s v== −∑ , where si 
is the percentage of seats of party i and vi the vote share of party i. Higher values indicate greater 
disproportionality. 
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12. Our data show a correlation between ballot structure and our measure of proportionality. Although this 
correlation is not dramatic (0.36), we estimate the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) in order to test the presence of 
multicollinearity in our models. All VIF scores are below 2.05 (including ballot structure and proportionality), 
which indicates that there is no evidence of multicollinearity. 
13. To be fair, the authors already acknowledged the multilevel structure of the data (Farrell and McAllister, 
2006: footnote 13, 746-747) but they argued that the limited number of elections prevented them from using a 
multilevel analysis. After three waves of CSES elections, we are in a privileged position to solve the problem. 
14. Our conclusions remain essentially the same if we use education as a proxy of political sophistication. This 
alternative model shows no significant differences among individuals with primary (or incomplete primary) 
education, but the effect of open ballot on satisfaction with democracy emerges among those with a university 
degree. Although we do not consider education as a good proxy of political sophistication, this alternative 
specification helps to make our results more robust. This model is not reported in the table but it is available 
upon request. 
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Table 1 – A replication of Farrell and McAllister (2006) 
 OLS Regression  Multilevel regression 
  MODEL 1   MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 
Ballot structure indicator       
(intra-party  dimension) 0.025**  0.048** 0.046** 0.024* 
  (0.001)  (0.015) (0.013) (0.011) 
Individual-level control variables      
Age -0.008**   -0.008** -0.008** 
  (0.001)   (0.001) (0.001) 
Age (squared) 0.000**   0.000** 0.000** 
  (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
Gender -0.032**   -0.02** -0.02** 
  (0.005)   (0.005) (0.006) 
Education 0.002   0.004** 0.004** 
  (0.001)   (0.002) (0.002) 
Unemployed -0.147**   -0.097** -0.097** 
  (0.010)   (0.011) (0.014) 
Income 0.036**   0.03** 0.03** 
  (0.002)   (0.002) (0.002) 
Political information    -0.03** -0.031** 
     (0.002) (0.003) 
Party voted won elections 0.183**   0.179** 0.179** 
  (0.005)   (0.005) (0.007) 
Country-level control variables      
Gallagher index -0.004**    -0.002 
  (0.000)    (0.003) 
Years of democratic experience 0.004**    0.004** 
  (0.000)    (0.001) 
Adults per MP 0.000**    -0.000 
  (0.000)    (0.000) 
Assembly Size -0.000**    0.000 
  (0.000)    (0.000) 
GDP (PPP in $) 0.000**    0.000** 
  (0.000)    (0.000) 
GDP growth 0.039**    0.053** 
  (0.001)    (0.012) 
Constant 2.105**  2.596**  2.367** -1.946** 
  (0.021)  (0.066) (0.58) (0.094) 
Observations 121903  134623 103054 103054 
Number of elections   85 85 85 
Notes: Ordinary least squares estimates (Models 1) and Maximum likelihood estimates in Models 2 to 4. 
Standard errors are in parenthesis. *Significant at 5%. **Significant at 1%. Base categories: Gender 
(male). 
 
Table 2 – The effect of ballot structure on satisfaction with democracy 
 MODEL 5 MODEL 6 MODEL 7 MODEL 8 
Ordered lists -0.265** -0.256** -0.166* -0.093 
  (0.150) (0.085) (0.073) (0.074) 
Personalized ballots (and personalized + closed lists) -0.308** -0.304** -0.194** -0.095 
  (0.139) (0.079) (0.079) (0.079) 
Closed lists -0.451** -0.445** -0.131 0.027 
  (0.152) (0.088) (0.113) (0.086) 
Ordered list ballot x Political Information    -0.025** 
     (0.007) 
Personalized ballot x Political Information    -0.034** 
     (0.007) 
Closed list ballot x Political Information    -0.036** 
     (0.008) 
Individual-level control variables     
Age  -0.008** -0.008** -0.008** 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age (squared)  0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Gender  -0.020** -0.020** -0.020** 
   (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Education  0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 
   (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Unemployed  -0.097** -0.097** -0.097** 
   (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Income  0.03** 0.03** 0.03** 
   (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Political information  0.031** 0.031** 0.031** 
   (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Party voted won elections  0.179** 0.179** 0.179** 
   (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Country-level control variables     
Gallagher index   0.001 0.001 
    (0.004) (0.004) 
Years of democratic experience   0.004** 0.004** 
    (0.001) (0.001) 
Adults per MP   0.00 0.00 
    (0.000) (0.000) 
Assembly Size   0.00 0.00 
    (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP (PPP in $)   0.000** 0.000** 
    (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP growth   0.053** 0.053** 
    (0.013) (0.013) 
Constant 2.872** 2.975** 2.271** 2.041** 
  (0.081) (0.071) (0.113) (0.111) 
Observations 134623 103054 103054 103054 
Number of elections 85 85 85 85 
Notes: Maximum likelihood estimates. Standard errors are in parenthesis. *Significant at 5%. 
**Significant at 1%. Base categories: Ballot structure (preferential and open list ballot); Gender (male). 
 
  
(1) With no control variables (2) With control variables 
 
Figure 1 – The effect of ballot structure on satisfaction with democracy 
Note: predicted values with the 95% confidence intervals 
 
 
(1) Low political information (2) High political information 
 
Figure 2 – Interactive effect of ballot structure and political information 
Note: predicted values with the 95% confidence intervals 
 
